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You have searched me, Lord, and you know me.  You know 
when I sit and when I rise; you perceive my thoughts from 
afar.  You discern my going out and my lying down; you are 
familiar with all my ways. (Psalm 139: 1-3)
The development of the human unborn has 
been the subject of curiosity and awe since the time 
of Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle.  Despite over 
two millennia of reflection about how the unborn 
should be looked upon by mature adult human be-
ings, the status of ourselves during pre-birth de-
velopment remains a divisive topic that gets to the 
core of who we are as distinct creatures in God’s 
created order.  My objective in this paper is to ex-
plore notions of respect and personhood as they 
have been applied to arguments for and against the 
ethical appropriateness of producing and using hu-
man embryos for research purposes.  I also hope 
that my reflections will get the reader to think about 
what to think about when considering the ethical is-
sues created by procreative technologies.  
During my master’s level studies in bioethics, 
I came to realize that secular bioethics was largely 
a process-driven discipline.  Our main textbook for-
warded a framework known by some as principlism, 
which embodies four concepts: autonomy, benevo-
lence, non-maleficence, and justice.1  The authors 
themselves, each favoring very different utilitarian 
and deontological ethical theories, proposed this 
framework on the sincere belief that bioethicists 
adhering to different ethical theories could use it 
as a commonly understood language with which 
to engage in eclectic bioethical discussions even if 
they professed to very divergent beliefs, values, and 
faiths.  Their framework has become the backbone 
of the dominant paradigm for decision-making in 
biomedical ethics today. 
 During my studies I became frustrated, not 
so much with the language being promulgated as 
with the lack of a moral foundation upon which 
the meaning of the language could be based. 
While adamantly denying that this framework is a 
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theory (they prefer to describe their moral concep-
tualization as moral reflection and construction2), 
the authors of principlism lapse into theory language 
often enough to reveal the tension in addressing 
bioethical issues with a common language that has 
no common grounding.  It is out of this experi-
ence that one can see the importance of explor-
ing whether the Christian tradition, particularly 
the Reformed tradition with its distinct reliance on 
and interpretation of Scripture, could contribute to 
a richer understanding of contemporary bioethi-
cal issues for the edification of both the Christian 
community and its public witness.
 In light of the widespread acceptance of in vitro 
fertilization and the resulting ethical quandary of 
what to do with its storehouse of left-over embry-
os, there continues to be a thriving debate over the 
moral appropriateness of thawing frozen human 
embryos or of creating new ones for the purpose 
of using and necessarily destroying them for scien-
tific purposes.  The overriding incentive for many 
researchers working in this area is the laudable goal 
of finding novel treatments for afflictions such as 
heart disease, type I diabetes, and Parkinson’s dis-
ease.  A major focus for many in this debate has 
been the moral status of these embryos, on which 
some feel the moral justification for creating and 
destroying them rests. 
 Two prominent concepts in this debate are 
those of respect of the embryo and whether embryos are 
persons.  Karen Lebacqz, a bioethicist ordained in 
the United Church of Christ, has been one of the 
strongest advocates for respecting the embryo. 
A major focus for many 
in this debate has been 
the moral status of these 
embryos, on which some 
feel the moral justification 
for creating and destroying 
them rests.
“Respect”, she writes, “is owed not simply to per-
sons, but very precisely to those who are always in 
danger of being cast outside the system of protec-
tion that personhood brings.  In such an under-
standing, an embryo need not be a person to be 
deserving of respect.  Indeed, it may be precisely 
because it is not considered a person that its value 
needs more urgently to be upheld.”3  Lebacqz’s po-
sition comes out of a concept of personhood cham-
pioned in the eighteenth  century by Immanuel 
Kant. According to Kant’s concept, a  person has 
self-determination and the defining quality of ra-
tional will.  However, since this and other human 
qualities are not inherently possessed by the em-
bryo, Lebacqz tries to salvage some value toward 
the embryo by attributing to it what she terms 
“respect.”  She states that the blastocyst (the early 
stage of the embryo consisting of about 120 cells) 
should not be treated cavalierly; instead, she speaks 
of it positively as “an entity with incredible value; 
as something precious that cannot be replaced by 
any other blastocyst, whose existence is to be cele-
brated and whose loss is to be grieved.” Yet, on the 
same page, she goes on to say that “such an entity 
can be used in research and can even be killed.  To 
do so is not in itself disrespectful.”4  
 Lebacqz justifies such a position by appealing 
to prima facie ethical duties, those duties which are 
considered normally required but which can be 
overridden in specific circumstances by other du-
ties with the risk of leaving ethically difficult resid-
ual effects.5  Applied here, Labecqz says that harm 
should be minimized if early embryos are to be 
used for research.  While preserving the life of the 
embryo should take priority, this priority is only in 
a context where it is possible to get the data from 
dissected embryonic stem cells while still preserv-
ing the embryo.  The implicit message seems clear: 
while preserving the embryo is desired over killing 
it, getting the data is the priority; and if the only 
way to do so is to kill the embryo, so be it.  She 
says that respect for the embryo can be expressed 
in the manner of killing, in the attitude expressed in 
the act.  Such respect is near the top of a hierarchy 
of respect, which includes lesser degrees of respect 
for animals and plants.  
 Christian ethicists Daniel Callahan and Gilbert 
Meilaender, from Roman Catholic and Lutheran 
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traditions, respectively, have countered that such 
talk is an empty exercise and that any value of the 
embryo has been stripped away in the absence of 
criteria for determining how to weigh the value of 
the embryo against the potential good of the re-
search to which it is subjected.6  In her response, 
ethicist Francoise Baylis quipped, “For certainly 
something is very odd in claiming to cherish the 
human embryo because of what it is while at the 
same time planning for its destruction.”7  
If the value of human embryos is thus based 
on an intuitive concept called respect, as described 
by Lebacqz, perhaps embryos are nothing more 
than clumps of cells, exploitable for the biological 
knowledge extracted as scientists see fit!  
Before making such a judgment, however, we 
should now look at the other concept on this de-
bate: personhood.  Several contemporary theologians, 
most notably Oliver O’Donovan, have enriched 
our understanding of personhood as it arose from 
early Christian thought.8  During the  fourth and 
fifth  centuries, debate raged in earnest on how to 
best express the nature of Christ and his relation-
ship with the Father and the Holy Spirit.  In this 
endeavor, our ancestors in the faith drew from 
both Latin and Greek but found both languages 
wanting in their efforts to express with scriptural 
faithfulness the divine-ness and human-ness of 
our Lord Jesus Christ.  The Latin-speaking church 
chose the word persona to capture the sense of 
Christ’s essence.  In the ancient theatre, the persona 
was the character-mask.  An actor played different 
characters, each represented by a different mask. 
Each character or persona became known through 
its history within the story.9  But a problem arose 
because the Latin word persona could not be eas-
ily translated conceptually into the language of the 
Eastern contingent of the still universal church. 
The closest Greek word for a mask or face, prosopon, 
was deemed too hollow in its meaning.  Therefore, 
the Greek-speaking church came to use the richer 
term hupostasis, or substance, which connoted a sub-
stantive reality that underlies or ties together the vari-
able qualities and characteristics that an individual 
may present.  However, disagreement persisted de-
spite efforts by leaders such as the Cappodocian 
fathers of the Greek church, who pleaded,  “We 
shall in no way quarrel about the names, as long 
as the words point to the same notion.”10 (Due 
in large part to similar efforts at linguistic rap-
prochement by Hilarius, bishop of Poitiers, and 
other Latin fathers, this problem did not formally 
split the Church, but confusion continued.)    At 
the same time, others were suggesting the more 
qualitative notions of the Trinitarian personhood, 
such  as activity.  For example, Apollinaris, fourth-
century bishop of Laodicea, suggested that Christ’s 
identity  be seen as self-conscious, action-directed mind; 
that is, a human mind was replaced by a divine 
mind embodied in human flesh.11  As we will see 
shortly, such ideas foreshadowed the modern ten-
dency to consider personhood as demonstrated 
qualities, with major implications for contempo-
rary decisions about the degree of human-ness to 
which unborn, developing human beings may be 
entitled.  Even Augustine suggested that God’s 
unity be compared with a human person and that 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be compared with 
three aspects of personality, such as memory, un-
derstanding, and will.12  Hendrikus Berkhof inter-
prets Augustine as distinguishing  three relations 
within God rather than substantial distinctions. 
Augustine also related the Trinity to love; that is, 
the Father as the lover, the Son as the object of 
love, and the Holy Spirit as the act of love.13 
 In 451, the Council of Chalcedon declared 
that the Trinity consisted of three persons. Within 
eighty years, Boethius (480 BC), dubbed by some  as 
the last of the Roman philosophers and first of the 
scholastic theologians, wrote an essay in which he 
attempted to better define nature and person.  While 
readily confessing that “the proper definition of 
Person is a matter of very great perplexity,”14 he bor-
rowed Aristotelian ideas of substance and corpo-
rality in defining a person as the individual substance 
of a rational nature.  In so doing, he acknowledged 
the connotation of hupostasis as indicating a higher 
value of substance than that of animals.  Despite 
such attempts at clarification, the idea of person 
remained elusive for many.  Anselm of Canterbury 
was so distraught in using “three persons” to con-
note “three substances” that he spoke of “three 
I do not know what” ; and no less than Thomas 
Aquinas felt that “person” meant “relation” albeit 
as “its own mode of being.”15  Furthermore, Jones 
and others have suggested that, had Aquinas un-
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derstood the intrinsic power of embryonic devel-
opment as we do today, he would have judged that 
human beings begin with the fusion of the sperm 
and the egg.  Thomistic principles also adhered to 
Boethius’s definition, such that human beings were 
considered persons in possessing a rational nature, 
even though the unborn may be unable to exer-
cise that reason.16   Boethius’s definition persisted, 
though its original meaning and Christological ba-
sis subsequently became eroded.  By the eighteenth 
century, personhood had come to mean a particu-
lar instance of a rational nature, stripped of its sub-
stantive core.   What was the secondary feature of 
Boethius’s definition, rational nature, became the 
primary feature.  Put another way, the dominant 
anthropology of Western culture had changed 
from valuing humans for who they are to valuing 
them for what they can do.
Unfortunately, Scripture does not directly, in so 
many Greek or Hebrew words, tell us what person-
hood is or when personhood is achieved in human 
development.  As a result, many Christians have 
turned to embryological and medical science for 
clarity.  Have these disciplines given us that clar-
ity?  We know now that the male and female con-
tribution to the procreative process are cells, not 
fluids or spirits or some other previously conceived 
substances or forms, through which pagan and 
Christian alike once envisioned that which could 
not be seen.  The union of those genetically differ-
ent cells results in a third genetically distinct en-
tity, which is not the sum of the parts but a unique 
biological being, alive and progressing in a devel-
opmental direction, programmed yet environmen-
tally-influenced to become a new creature.  With 
conception also begins a new history, a biological 
and historical continuity, which grows, leaving a trail 
of what it was and a prescription for what it can 
become.17  
Some would say, however, that the embryo and 
the early fetus are simply biological beings, geneti-
cally human but without characteristics and quali-
ties indicative of a functioning human being.  In its 
attempt to judge the severity of penance for harm 
inflicted on the unborn, the medieval church ap-
pealed to Aristotelian distinctions, which differ-
ently valued so-called unformed and formed stages 
of development (Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s claim 
that complete formation of the organs occurs at 40 
days from conception for males and 90 days for fe-
males.  Ensoulment reputedly occurred at this time 
as well18).  From these roots developed qualitative 
criteria for determining humanness and person-
hood.  O’Donovan has referred to Kant’s practical 
imperative as the prototype of the modern prefer-
ence for qualitative conceptions.19  Picking up sys-
tematically where Boethius left off, Kant, whose 
insights have shaped so much of contemporary 
humanist ethics, argued that the value of humanity 
that  is distinct and  most prized above that of all 
other creatures and objects of the temporal order 
is the rational nature, which must respect itself.  This 
respect can be in the form of self-respect or respect 
of other human beings.  For Kant, it is the generic 
rational nature that is the object of esteem, the objec-
tive end of our moral law, not the individual in which 
it appears.  
From this Kantian bend in the Western philo-
sophical road also comes the concept of personal-
ity. Hendrikus Berkhof traces this from what he 
calls a cult of “the person” arising out of the mod-
Unfortunately, in 
efforts to counter the 
impersonalization of the 
Holy Spirit by modern 
liberal theology, evangelicals 
introduced the personality 
of the Holy Spirit with the 
modern connotations of an 
autonomy of personality, 
which further supported the 
position of those who saw 
human value in human 
qualities and function.
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ernism of the late nineteenth century.  This con-
denses, he says, to personality as autonomous and 
self-conscious power with its own moral strength 
and respect for itself.20  Unfortunately, in efforts to 
counter the impersonalization of the Holy Spirit by 
modern liberal theology, evangelicals introduced 
the personality of the Holy Spirit with the modern 
connotations of an autonomy of personality, which 
further supported the position of those who saw 
human value in human qualities and function.
 Does such a concept of personhood as per-
sonality gain support from theologians in the 
Reformed tradition?  Generally not, but then per-
sonhood is not addressed in systematic way.  As 
mentioned earlier, Augustine was clearly unhappy 
with the term persona and felt that the term fit bet-
ter in describing the triune God than did what he 
called the three relations within the Godhead.  In 
fact, says Berkhof, in general the Reformers were 
not particularly interested in this terminological 
heritage of the church.  Calvin’s own stated pref-
erence of person as a subsistence in God’s essence, 
related to the other persons but distinguished by an 
incommunicable quality, could hardly be claimed as a 
clarification of the matter.21,22  Kuyper saw the soul 
of each individual as a unique creative act of God. 
God creates the soul and the body in the embryo, 
and human personality develops in the person that 
is the union of body and soul.  Beyond this, both 
Kuyper and later Herman Bavinck acknowledged 
the mystery of human individuality and of human 
personhood in light of an immediate relationship 
with God.23  
Gene Outka, in his comprehensive exploration 
of the meaning of agape love in the Christian life, 
sees a person as an object of concern, of reverence, 
with acknowledged value as a person and with whom 
personal involvement is desired.  Agape is the at-
titude toward such a person, and such a concept of 
person is independent of particular qualities and 
behavior tendencies.  We acknowledge value in a 
fellow human being; we do not, or should not, be-
stow value on a neighbor.24  
Gordon Spykman has written that Western 
dualistic anthropologies lead to insuperable dilem-
mas in addressing the issue of abortion.  If one 
posits a separation of some sort between body 
and soul, says Spykman, then the problem arises: 
During which trimester does the fetus become a 
person?  He states  that “For a biblical view of man, 
human life in the integrally coherent unity of its 
bodily-spiritual wholeness begins embryonically at 
conception….For a divinely bestowed sanctity is 
insinuated into the total fabric of human life from 
its sunset years all the way back to its inception.”25 
In his study of humans as the image of God, 
Anthony Hoekema argues that humankind’s 
unique value is tied to the post-Fall retention of the 
image of God.  This view is supported by referenc-
es such Genesis 9:6, which describes the violence 
done to God’s image if human blood is shed by an-
other human.26  This creationally endowed aspect 
of our creatureliness provides one of the strongest 
supports for inherent human value, which may be 
described as personhood.   
Today, many Christians and non-Christians 
have chosen to adopt a concept of person whose 
meaning and essence is defined by attributes, with-
out which a human may no longer be conceived 
of as a person.  As Margaret Summerville recently 
suggested, we seem to have become human do-
ings instead of human beings.27  And, by this way 
of thinking, the attributes most valued and most 
often associated with personality and thus with 
person appear to emanate from brain tissue, from 
whence originates rationality and spiritual possibil-
ities.28  From this concept follow two perceptions 
that affect a prevalent attitude regarding human 
embryos: a conviction that human personality can 
be the object of experimental knowledge and that 
humanness can be typed accordingly into person, 
non-person, or pre-person.  Seeing this conviction 
in the light of the liberal scientific value of getting 
control of ourselves, we conclude that our bio-
logical way of being goes from that which we live 
to that which we observe and, ultimately, to that 
which we conquer in an effort to achieve human 
self-transcendence.   
What is meant by self-transcendence?  While 
the transcendence of God, in the traditional 
Christian sense, alludes to God’s providential mas-
tery over all that is created, self-transcendence, in 
a temporally restricted sense, refers to the human 
subordination of material reality toward higher or 
spiritual ends.  Using Calvin’s metaphor, as applied 
to science through materialistic spectacles, human 
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beings subject material objects to experimental 
scrutiny for the exploitative purpose of assert-
ing themselves transcendently over those objects 
through the knowledge obtained.  In the absence 
of a relationship with God, however, the human 
spirit is elusive, trying to grow with knowledge to 
become the subject of the science itself, the spirit 
of the resultant knowledge.  Paradoxically, how-
ever, in scientifically studying ourselves as objects, 
we cannot see ourselves as a whole.  Consequently, 
the part of us that is spirit is withdrawn from such 
scientific study and becomes elusive.  O’Donovan 
suggests that our fascination with the study of the 
brain is one attempt to tie down spirit to its pre-
sumed material substrate and that doing so allows 
us to assert our transcendence over it. 29
In applying this idea to embryo experimenta-
tion, the tension thus arises wherein the embryo 
is human like us yet is considered an appropriate 
object of experimentation because it seems to be 
devoid of the attributes that make up personality, 
which expresses the human spirit.  The embryo be-
comes, in effect, undifferentiated humanity, from 
which spirit and personality have not yet arisen 
from the biological substrate.  Human embryos 
then become experimental projects of self-mastery, 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, 
rather than objects of human love.  The human 
embryo itself becomes ambiguous: it is ourselves 
yet not ourselves.  These members of our own 
species become negatively special because they are not 
. . . a Reformed 
interpretation of the post-
Fall image of God supports 
human personhood as an 
inherent essence of who we 
are, apart from the qualities 
and gifts given to us by 
God’s gracious providence.
meant to become objects of our love and compas-
sion.  Indeed, such language begins to have over-
tones of the respect of which Karen Lebaczq speaks, 
in the quest to impart value and meaning to em-
bryos.  That which we have made in the laboratory, 
rather than begotten, is now at our disposal rather 
than someone to be engaged in a nurturing and an-
ticipatory fellowship.  Is this the way we should be? 
Is self-transcendence by experimental knowledge 
the telos, the ultimate good for humankind?   
At the level of embryology, there are, in my 
judgment, no developmental biological milestones 
that separate the person from the non-person. 
When I am confronted with the suggestion that 
implantation onto the wall of the uterus signals the 
first time an embryo becomes a person because it 
has its own blood supply distinct from that of its 
mother, I point out that human cancers also de-
velop their own blood supply when they get to a 
certain stage.  The same biological principle seems 
to hold for both.  When the inner cells of a grow-
ing cell cluster can no longer survive simply by os-
motic diffusion of nutrients from its surroundings, 
genes encoded to produce and secrete vascular 
growth factors are activated, and a nutritive vas-
cular plumbing is generated.  Does that biological 
necessity change the valuation of a human cancer? 
Indeed, is it transformed into a distinct person or a 
clone of the person for which it now competes for 
nutrients?  I think not.  
Similarly, at the psychological level, emotive 
stimuli have been forwarded as grounds for con-
ferring personhood.  In their book How Now Shall 
We Live, Chuck Colson and Nancy Pearcey relate 
the story of the abortionist Bernard Nathanson. 
As a technically skilled obstetrician in a thriving 
abortion clinic, Nathanson kept himself aloof 
from the human side of the plight of his unborn 
patients.  With the advent of ultrasound, he now 
saw the features of the fetus in real time animation, 
and, as Colson and Pearcey put it, the medical facts 
now coalesced with the grainy image on the screen 
and crashed into Nathanson’s consciousness.30  A 
human being was in front of him and would soon 
be destroyed.  It was an epiphanal moment for him. 
But images of flailing projections destined to be-
come appendages are one thing.  What about the 
embryo?  It lacks such humanoid qualities.  It is 
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a speck, like a poppy seed or, using a biblical im-
age of the kingdom of God on earth, a growing 
mustard seed.  If one saw it under a video micro-
scope powerful enough to see cytoplasm moving 
or chromosomes parting to form two new pluri-
potent cells of the growing organism, would that 
conjure up images sufficient to “crash into one’s 
consciousness”?  Is the value in the embryo, or is 
the value to be bestowed on the embryo?
Let’s sum up for a moment some major points. 
First, there seem to be no developmental stages that 
signify the appearance of increasing human value 
during pre-birth development.  Second, the preva-
lent modern concept of personhood in our culture 
views human beings as persons by virtue of their 
qualities and capacities rather than through inher-
ent worth. This concept excludes early developing 
human beings from consideration as persons, leav-
ing them vulnerable to treatment deemed crimi-
nal against more mature human beings.  Third, a 
Reformed interpretation of the post-Fall image of 
God supports human personhood as an inherent 
essence of who we are, apart from the qualities and 
gifts given to us by God’s gracious providence.  But 
how is our personhood, so conceived, fully realized. 
If it is not realized through matured qualities and 
attributes, then through what, or whom?  Recall 
that both Kuyper and Bavinck acknowledged the 
mystery of human individuality and of human per-
sonhood preserved in an immediate relation with 
God, a mystery which Berkouwer said no science 
or theology can unveil for us.31  
Is it this mystery that we are trying to overcome 
in our pursuit of biological knowledge?  Is mys-
tery a confession of ignorance, a lack of control, 
the inability to capitalize on the greatest number 
of choices that full biological knowledge can offer? 
If one thinks about it, the loss of mystery predict-
ably puts us into a tailspin of reductionism such 
that what we grab onto and think we understand 
as knowledge becomes more than it really is.  It be-
comes the key to unlocking the mystery and comes 
to stand for all that is important to know about an 
object or organism.  Not just biological mystery but 
then all mystery becomes lost, and with that loss, 
our self-transcendence fills the void.  
Could God have created us so that mystery 
would be a normative part of our existence and of 
our understanding of our relationship to Him?  In 
Eden we disobeyed God in an effort to self-tran-
scend, to know good from evil, to be like God. 
We paid for it then with our lives.32  Some today 
plead for humility to maintain a sense of mystery 
and of a budding relationship with even the young-
est of the unborn.  Bouma and his colleagues have 
adopted a covenantal view, through which they 
suggest attention should move away from whether 
unborn human beings image God toward whether 
those with responsibility to protect and nurture 
the vulnerable among us are doing so.33  Gilbert 
Meilaender writes, “We need the virtue of humility 
before the mystery of human personhood and the 
succession of generations.”34  He sees the unborn as 
“simply the weakest and most needy members of our 
community”(his emphasis).35  He encourages an 
unconditional commitment to parenthood to the 
unseen unborn, wherein “The time of pregnancy 
will be better spent learning to love the child we 
have been given before we begin to evaluate and 
assess the child’s capacities.”36  This disposition 
has been expressed recently in a poignant expres-
sion of wonder, anticipation, and ultimately grief, 
by William Nathan Sneller in the November 2006 
edition of The Banner.  He shares with us the loss of 
their one-month-old, unborn human being, whom 
he referred to as their child:  “He was not our mis-
carriage; he was our child...[;]we quickly overlook 
those God knows only in the womb.”37  Indeed, 
what about those who are conceived in a Petri dish 
and never see a womb?  
I think that we need to retain the sense of awe, 
fear, humility, and contriteness that mystery in-
spires.  Reformed ethicist Allen Verhey speaks of 
mystery in a creational sense and of God as the 
Ultimate Mystery: 
  We live in God’s world, and we encounter 
mystery.  Mystery evokes among us sense of its 
presence and power.  Mystery evokes a sense of 
dependence upon some dimly known but reliable 
order, a sense of gratitude for the givenness (the 
gifts) of life and health…and it evokes a keen sense 
of responsibility to the inscrutable Mystery [that 
is, God,] who sustains the order, gives the gifts, 
judges the flaw, and promises hope.38  
And regarding the consequences of losing this 
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sense of mystery he notes,
When, in teaching the young, we empty the 
world of wonder, when we eliminate mystery in 
our quest for mastery, then we distort their vision 
and their lives….Christians sometimes respond 
to the mystery by reducing God to a giant puzzle 
or by attempting to domesticate God, rendering 
the inscrutable not only scrutable but serviceable 
to their own projects, to their own individual or 
communal causes.39   
Finally, we hear Paul Ramsey, in his book 
Fabricated Man: 
  Men may be able to subdue the mystery of 
procreation, they may be able to subdue all the 
wonders of human sexual response, in their sci-
ences.  But they cannot subdue the mystery in the 
fact that eminently human communications of 
marital love are also the places where we engage 
as pro-creators, and establish the step into cov-
enant parenthood.  Men can only deny that there 
is any mystery to be honored here; they can only 
reduce the matter to an accident of biological na-
ture that could as well not have been so, or could 
be changed to vegetative reproduction.40   
In its fullest, uncorrupted expression, person-
hood encompasses the covenantal relationship 
with God the Creator, a relationship badly distort-
ed by sin yet renewed and sustained by grace.   
We need to think humbly and think hard about 
what we are doing when we begin to make some-
thing that would otherwise be begotten.  Do we need 
the embryo as the basis of cellular therapies for 
some diseases?  Can we redirect our financial and 
human resources toward therapies that can be de-
rived from other stem cells that are not genetically 
unique beings, do not come into being through 
conception, and are not meant by their very na-
ture to be the objects of love as distinct creatures? 
Christian communities remain divided on this and 
other bioethical issues.  They need to persevere, 
not capitulate, in their prayerful desire for insight, 
deliberation, and discernment; test the spirits faith-
fully; and distinguish that which is Holy and that 
which is not.
While Scripture may not speak directly and 
precisely to many of our current ethical concerns, 
it does teach us to be always in awe of our God 
who made us and knew us intimately as unborn. 
In Psalm 51 we read, “Surely, I was sinful from the 
time my mother conceived me.”  In Jeremiah 1:5, 
the word of the Lord calls out, “Before I formed 
you in the womb I knew you, before you were born 
I set you apart; I appointed you as a prophet to the 
nations.”  And in his perplexed anguish, Job calls 
out, “Did you not pour me out like milk and curdle 
me like cheese, clothe me with skin and flesh and 
knot me together with bones and sinews?  You gave 
me life and showed me kindness….”  But perhaps 
Psalm 139: 13-16, 23, 24, continued from the be-
ginning of this paper, gives us the true spirit of the 
intimacy of our relationship to God at all times: 
  For you created my inmost being; you knit me 
together in my mother’s womb.  I praise you be-
cause I am fearfully and wonderfully made; your 
works are wonderful, I know that full well.  My 
frame was not hidden from you when I was made 
in the secret place.  When I was woven together 
in the depths of the earth, your eyes saw my un-
formed body.  All the days ordained for me were 
written in your book before one of them came to 
be…Search me, God, and know my heart; test me 
and know my anxious thoughts.  See if there is any 
offensive way in me and lead me in the way ever-
lasting.  
Thus says the Lord.  
Could God have created 
us so that mystery would 
be a normative part of 
our existence and of our 
understanding of our 
relationship to Him?
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